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Between the ‘Bank screw’ and ‘affording assistance’. Rules, 
Standards, and the Bank Charter Act of 1844    
 




This article explores a dilemma at the centre of the monetary order: how to counter inflation 
eroding the value of money and simultaneously allow bank-created credit to meet the needs of an 
expanding economy. Building on recent scholarship on the history of money, this article analyses 
the Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the financial crisis of 1847 to reveal a response to this dilemma 
which continues to shape the modern context. That response puts its faith in ex ante restrictive 
measures in a bid to limit the discretion of the monetary authorities and cultivate financially 
prudent behaviour. Yet the history of the mid-nineteenth century exposes the challenges faced by 
those who enforce such rules, challenges which tie the mid-nineteenth century to the post 2008 
reforms in both the US and the Eurozone, and reveal the on-going force of the dilemma: that 
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A little reflection makes it appear a monstrous proposition that … the conduct of so important 
a branch of finance as the paper circulation of the State should be intrusted, without any 
control, to twenty-four irresponsible merchants [the directors of the Bank of England], to 
whom power is thus given which affects more or less the property of every subject of the 
realm.1 (Samson Ricardo, 1837).  
  
I attribute the whole pressure of the last year [1847] to the positive restriction placed upon 
the Bank [of England] by the Act of 1844; if that restriction had not been in existence … 
when the public required a further issue to supply notes and coin withdrawn from circulation, 
I believe there would have been nothing like the distress occasioned.2 (Horsely Palmer, 
1848).  
 
The ‘monstrous proposition’ feared by Samson Ricardo was the Bank of England’s discretion over 
the creation of paper money. The ‘positive restriction’ identified by Horsely Palmer was the Bank 
Charter Act of 1844, the very legislation enacted to curb the discretion Ricardo saw as ‘monstrous’. 
Ricardo and the other critics of the Bank of England (‘BoE’), including the so-called ‘currency 
school’ of monetary theorists, pointed to the BoE’s discretion over money creation as one example 
                                               
1 S. Ricardo, Observations on the Recent Pamphlet of J. Horsely Palmer (London: Charles Knight, 1837) 37.  




of the ‘vast powers wielded by that establishment’3 which left other banks ‘wholly at [its] mercy’.4 
The Act of 1844 countered such vast powers by forcing the BoE to back its paper note issue with 
reserves of gold. To its supporters that made the Act an ‘indispensable ingredient’,5 one which 
provided holders of paper money with security by countering ‘caprice and arbitrary action’ on the 
part of the BoE ‘uncontrolled by any legal limit’.6   
  
Yet, between 1844 and 1866 the government suspended the Act during financial crises on three 
separate occasions. Each suspension responded to concerns that the Act was too restrictive, 
concerns Palmer was not alone in holding. Others chided the ‘rigid inflexible spirit’ of the Act,7 
referring to it as a ‘straight-waistcoat’8 that ‘unjustly restricts the banking business of the country’9 
and leaves commerce ‘cramped and paralyzed’.10 According to the currency school’s arch-
opponent and leading figure in the rival ‘banking school’, Thomas Tooke, the strict enforcement 
of the Act led to ‘ridiculous … lamentable catastrophe’.11 
                                               
3 W. Clay, HC Deb vol 95 col 587 2 December 1847. 
4 R. Peel, HC Deb vol 75 col 861 13 June 1844. 
5 Testimony of J. G. Hubbard, Report from the Select Committee on Bank Acts (HC, 1857, 220-X) Q. 2351. 
6 ibid, Q. 2463. 
7 E. S. Cayley, HC Deb vol 92 col 247 30 April 1847. 
8 Lord Ashburton, The Financial and Commercial Crisis Considered (London: John Murray, 2nd ed, 1847) 9. 
9 Editorial, ‘The Present Position of the Issue Department of the Bank of England’, Bankers’ Magazine, October 
1847, 469. 
10 Editorial, ‘The Foreign Exchanges and Our Home Currency’, Bankers’ Magazine, July 1844, 226. 




This encounter between constraints and flexibility captures a dilemma which cuts to the core of 
the monetary order. Money creation by commercial banks is central to that order. Banks create 
money by extending credit to others in the form of a promise to pay in the state’s currency. So 
leveraging the state’s currency is a hugely dynamic arrangement because it allows the credit system 
to respond to the needs of those capitalists these banks deem of sufficient creditworthiness.12 But 
it is also a fragile arrangement because the credit advanced is a bet on future productivity.13 From 
that fragility follows one half of the dilemma. Should those who create the state’s currency extend 
support to commercial banks? To refuse to do so raises doubts about the viability of these banks 
and about the viability of the credit they create. In the absence of such viability Palmer’s ‘distress’ 
and Tooke’s ‘ridiculous … lamentable catastrophe’ follow: contractual counterparties go without 
payment; manufacturers sell assets to keep creditors at bay; wage earners are laid-off. And yet, 
although extending support to commercial banks counters this distress, it also reveals the flip-side 
of the dilemma. Where the monetary authorities can create money at will, what is to stop these 
authorities from doing so to benefit special interests or the whims of those in power? And where 
that money creation outpaces the resources of an economy, inflation will undermine incomes and 
spending power and so will ‘affect more or less the property of every subject of the realm’. How, 
                                               
12 See J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1911, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
Eng tr, 1936). 
13 C. Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 428. 
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then, should we protect the value of assets denominated in the state’s currency? Is it necessary to 
constrain those who create money to stabilise the value of money?14  
 
One response to these questions directs central banks to maintain price stability, including, for 
example, the Federal Reserve Bank in the US and the European Central Bank (ECB).15 To whom 
they may lend is also curtailed: section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA), constrains the 
ability of the Federal Reserve to act as a lender of last resort; Articles 123 and 125 of the European 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007 (TFEU) limit the capacity of the ECB to 
support public debt. And yet the dilemma facing the monetary authorities–how to engineer sound 
money and, simultaneously, safeguard the viability of credit creating banks–persists. As the events 
                                               
14 This dilemma between constraints and flexibility is another way of capturing the tension between discipline and 
elasticity described by Perry Mehrling in The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Mehrling draws inspiration from Hyman Minsky’s famous Financial 
Instability Hypothesis, see H. Minsky, ‘The Financial-Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior 
of the Economy’ in C. P. Kindleberger and J-P. Laffargue (eds), Financial Crises: Theory, History and Policy 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1982) 13. Others who explore the consequences that follow from this dilemma in the modern 
context include M. Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016), H. S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion: Protecting the Financial System from Panics 
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2016), and K. Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of 
Comparative Economics 315. 
15 See Federal Reserve Act 1913, s 2A (as amended by 12 U.S.C. 225a) and Statute of the European Central Bank, 
Article 2.  
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of 2008 unfolded these constraints gave way to flexibility as the public authorities in both 
jurisdictions opted to rescue banks and sovereigns.16 
 
Building on Christine Desan’s ‘constitutional approach to money’,17 this article analyses the Bank 
Charter Act of 1844 and the financial crisis of 1847 to reveal a common response to this dilemma 
which ties the mid-nineteenth century to the modern context. That response builds on the close 
connection between constraints and the advantages typically associated with formal rules. Ideally, 
rules signal, with clarity and precision, the content of obligations before actions take place. The 
aim of such ex ante measures is to prevent harmful conduct from occurring by changing the 
behaviour of the authorities and of those who might turn to the authorities for support. The post-
2008 reforms in both the US and the Eurozone offer examples of this type of preventative legal 
measure, a point to which this article returns in a later section. So too does the Bank Charter Act 
of 1844, a piece of legislation characterised by scholars as  ‘perhaps the first attempt to introduce 
central banking ‘rules’’.18  
                                               
16 For an overview of these events in Europe, see K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional 
Analysis (Oxford: OUP, 2014), and for the US, see P.A. Wallach, To the Edge: Legality, Legitimacy, and the 
Responses to the 2008 Financial Crisis (Washington D. C: Brooking Institute Press, 2015).  
17 C. Desan, ‘The Constitutional Approach to Money: Monetary Design and the Production of the Modern World’ in 
N. Bandelj, F. F. Wherry, and V. Zelizer (eds) Money Talks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017) 109, 112. 
See also J. K. Moudud, ‘Analyzing the Constitutional Theory of Money: Governance, Power, and Instability’ (2018) 
31 Leiden Journal of International Law 289. 
18 M. Smith, ‘On Central Banking ‘Rules’: Tooke’s Critique of the Bank Charter Act of 1844’ (2003) 25(1) Journal 
of the History of Economic Thought 39, 39. Others who make the same point about the Act include D. Laidler, 




Under the influence of the currency school’s ideas, the Act of 1844 sought to secure the value of 
money by adding credibility to the BoE’s commitment to the gold standard. It did so through a 
rule which fixed the creation of BoE notes to flows of gold: when gold left the country the BoE 
was unable to create additional BoE notes. One objective of that legal measure was to change the 
behaviour of the BoE. With its note issue capped, the Act encouraged the BoE to recognise the 
increased value of its remaining notes by raising the rate at which it swapped these notes for bills 
of exchange – a move characterised at the time as turning the ‘Bank screw’.19 The normative appeal 
of the Act followed from this limited note issue because, with fewer notes available, the Act 
discouraged the BoE from ‘affording assistance to the mercantile world’.20 With the BoE short of 
the necessary quantity of notes to afford such assistance, the ‘mercantile world’ too would have to 
adjust its behaviour by learning to take care of itself, even if that left many merchants and bankers 
without security and exposed to the threat of insolvency.  
  
                                               
12; G. Campbell, ‘Government Policy during the British Railway Mania and the 1847 Commercial Crisis’ in N. 
Dimsdale and A. Hotson (eds) British Financial Crisis since 1825 (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 12; and C. R. Whittlesey, 
‘Rules, Discretion, and Central Bankers’ in C. R. Whittlesey and J. S. G. Wilson (eds), Essays in Money and 
Banking in Honour of R. S. Sayers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) 252. 
19 For examples of contemporaries using this phrase, see Bankers’ Magazine, June 1844 and July 1844; E. S. 
Cayley, HC Deb Vol 92 col 245 30 April 1847; J. M. Knott, The Bank of England Charter Act, 1844, and the 
Manchester Commercial Association (London, 1855) 3.  
20 R. Peel, Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons, May 6th and 20th, 1844, on 




As a response to the monetary dilemma, ex ante preventative rules are almost compelling. In theory 
at least, adherence to rules sees the authorities favour the long-term benefits of sound money over 
superficially attractive, but ultimately short-sighted, support for special interest groups. Supporting 
interests such as those of commercial banks is short-sighted because it arguably serves only to 
encourage the financially reckless behaviour that leaves banks dependent on public support. Tying 
the hands of the authorities pushes in the opposite direction: it disciplines commercial banks by 
shielding the authorities from demands for short-term, expedient fixes. By so doing, it seeks to 
turn those who might call for public support into rational businesses and consumers, prudently 
planning and faithfully transacting their business without fear of money losing its value. Without 
strict adherence to the rules, however, these changes in behaviour are less secure: if the rules might 
be suspended or circumvented, why behave differently?  
 
As the three suspensions of the Act of 1844 suggest, ex ante rules, credible commitments21 and 
‘ideal monetary rules’22 perhaps promise more than they can deliver. To work out why, this article 
draws on the classic debate in legal theory and in monetary theory regarding rules and standards. 
Recent scholarship contributing to that debate has tended to indicate the limits in practice of the 
                                               
21 The literature on credible commitment mechanisms is inspired by F. Kydland and E. Prescott, ‘Rules Rather than 
Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’ (June 1977) Journal of Political Economy 473, and further 
developed by M. Bordo, The Gold Standard and Related Regimes: Collected Essays (Cambridge: CUP, 1999). In 
this literature, tying the hands of the authorities is necessary to combat time-inconsistent policies. Without the 
credible commitment, the authorities may be inconsistent over time by deviating from their preferred, pre-
announced long-term policy to satisfy short-term interests.  
22 Bordo, ibid, 5. 
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distinction between rigid, clear rules and elastic, discretionary standards. This article seizes on the 
collapse of the dichotomy. Although the Act of 1844 is the quintessence of a rule-bound regime, 
during the crisis of 1847 a degree of discretionary judgement smoothed over its hard edges. That 
discretion is revealing. It reveals decision-makers responding to events unanticipated by those who 
designed the rules. Furthermore, it reveals the limits to rules as a means of channeling behaviour: 
accidents happen; the future is uncertain; incentives are complex; and crises are systemic. Strict 
enforcement downplays these phenomena because credibility depends on rigid application. Yet, 
how credible is a rule the benefits of which do not outweigh its costs? The dynamics of a financial 
crisis–contractual defaults and asset fire sales spread harm far and wide–add to the burden of the 
calculation. Whatever the rule-applier decides, the process itself shows rules blurring into 
discretion, and that takes us back to the dilemma at the centre of our monetary order, namely how 
to both support commercial banks and discipline them.    
 
This article is structured around six main sections, as follows. The first section situates the dilemma 
explored in this article within the broader historical scholarship on money by introducing Christine 
Desan’s ‘constitutional approach to money’. The next section reviews the scholarship in legal 
theory on the debate between rules and standards. Guided by the tendency of rules and standards 
to converge, the third and fourth sections turn to the particular legal regime put in place by the 
Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the way that regime responded to the simultaneous need to secure 
both stable money and viable banks. The fifth section explores the re-emergence of discretion in a 
context where the Act’s supporters had hoped to curtail situation specific judgement through clear, 
rigid rules. The final main section traces a number of threads connecting the story of the Act of 
1844 and the crisis of 1847 to the events of 2008 and suggests that the challenges faced in the 
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1840s remain relevant today given the direction taken by the post 2008 reforms in both the US and 
the Eurozone.  
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO MONEY 
  
Christine Desan’s constitutional approach to money challenges what others have labeled the 
orthodox approach to money. In the orthodox account people discover rather than create money 
and the money that they discover evolves in response to market forces, emerging from private 
barter as an instrument ‘inaugurated to ease exchange in the mists of time’.23 In Desan’s account, 
by contrast, instead of discovering it ‘societies engineer money’,24 which requires that they invent 
ways of orchestrating the creation of liquidity through work that ‘is constant and collective’ and 
‘involves both public initiative and individual decision-making.25 Money then is ‘a project that 
relates participants one to another and each to the group, defining authority and distributing 
resources as it operates’.26   
 
                                               
23 Desan, n 17 above, 112.  
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. See also R. Kreitner, ‘Legal History of Money’ (1996) 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 415, 
424. 
26 C. Desan, ‘Theorizing Money in Three Dimensions’ in C. Desan (ed), Re-theorizing Liquidity: Money, Credit, 




The manner by which money ties participants to one another and to the group helps to explain, 
rather than merely identify, money’s functions as a unit of account, means of exchange, and mode 
of payment. A community could mobilise resources by compensating those who provide goods 
and services in-kind, paying soldiers with chocolate bars for example. Alternatively, that 
community could issue a token–a stamped piece of metal or an engraved piece of paper–in return 
for the goods and services. By singling out that token as a mode of settling debts owed to the 
community (such as taxes, fees, and fines) the community creates demand for the token across all 
members of the community. As Desan puts it, the public authorities ‘spend by allocating units 
[tokens] for the kind of goods they need from people and tax back units [tokens] in the same 
measure’.27 Through this process of tax and spend, resources are mobilised and the community 
creates a unit of account.   
 
The community is the common creditor shared by all of the community’s members. Since all of 
the community’s members need to obtain the tokens accepted by the community to cancel taxes, 
fees and fines, members have an incentive to accept these tokens to cancel debts owed by one 
member to another. When members of the community write up and settle their IOUs using the 
tokens issued by the community, these tokens start to operate as a medium of exchange. 
Furthermore, the token will start to operate as a mode of payment when, as Desan puts it, the public 
authorities ‘set their unit apart from all others by privileging its use as the only enforceable way to 
                                               
27 Desan, n 17 above, 113. 
12 
 
pay: if public tribunals recognize the official unit alone as the way of settling debts and other 
obligations, it will become the means of choice’.28   
 
That the creation of money requires a relationship between the collective and each of its members 
does not, however, tell us much about the details of that relationship. As Desan explains, ‘Every 
engineering challenge identified above – taxing and spending to create a commensurate unit, 
supporting money’s private use as a medium, enforcing it as a mode of payment – can be 
institutionalized in different ways and by different actors’.29 Sovereigns might issue money 
directly, or they might delegate its creation to commercial banks. At times the issuer of paper 
money commits to convert the token into a precious metal, thereby giving the holder of the paper 
a type of collateral. At other times the issuer’s commitment is to convert into the currency of 
another polity. Regardless of the specific design, the presence of political authority remains a 
constant. Those authorised to act on behalf of the group engineer the monetary order, and by so 
doing make difficult political choices over which interests to protect and which to leave 
vulnerable.    
 
                                               
28 ibid, 114. 
29 ibid, 115. 
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Desan’s constitutional approach to money is part of a broader tradition of scholarship which asserts 
that money is intimately wrapped up with political authority.30 But Desan, in the words of one 
reviewer of her work, also ‘expands the limited theoretical interventions’ of this tradition into 
‘positive, empirical claims by telling the story of [English and] British money through law from 
the fall of Rome to the eighteenth-century financial revolution’.31 In fact, Desan’s historical 
account ends where this article begins, with the nineteenth century gold standard. In keeping with 
the overall argument of her recent work, Desan captures the public authority underpinning the gold 
standard as a system of monetary governance.32 By so doing, she also asks us to confront the 
distributional consequences which follow from its design. As Desan explains, ‘[t]he monetary 
order known as the Gold Standard was the vehicle for compromise’.33 Those who designed it 
recognised the economic ‘dynamism’ made possible by bank created notes and demand deposits 
and so ‘accepted bank currency as an important part of modern exchange’.34 Yet the architects of 
the gold standard also tied the creation of domestic money to international flows of gold, ‘to 
                                               
30 See, for example, G.F. Knapp, The State Theory of Money (1905, London: Macmillan, Eng tr, 1924) and L.R. 
Wray, Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
31 A. D. Edwards, ‘The American Revolution and Christine Desan’s New History of Money’ (2017) 42(1) Law & 
Social Inquiry 254. 
32 In his book The Making of Modern Finance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), Samuel Knafo makes a broadly similar 
argument by showing that that the gold standard extended, rather than restricted, the power of the state over money 
by, for example, centralizing the note issue and fashioning modern central banking. 
33 Desan, n 13 above, 404. 
34 ibid, 399, 404. 
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commerce outside of national borders’.35 They did so ‘as a means to test and secure its value’,36 
and used ideas drawn from David Hume–ideas to which we return in a moment–to justify their 
chosen arrangement.  
 
The compromise identified by Desan captures the dilemma at the centre of the monetary order: 
that simultaneous desire for both expansive credit and sound money. With that dilemma in the 
background, this article brings to the foreground the details of the specific monetary regime 
designed by those who acted on behalf of the British polity in the mid-nineteenth century. That 
regime was a product of legal engineering, with the Bank Charter Act of 1844 central to the edifice. 
Built into its design was a possible solution to the monetary dilemma, one which attempted to 
stabilise the value of money by disciplining commercial banks. Implementing that solution entailed 
the allocation of legal entitlements, which called forth further decisions over whether to define 
these entitlements ex ante, through rules specifying legal outcomes in advance, or ex post, through 
standards specifying outcomes after actions have taken place and in light of situation specific facts. 
As we will see, the architects of Britain’s mid-nineteenth century monetary order had a strong 
preference for rules and, indeed, the Act of 1844 is frequently referenced as a clear example of a 
rule bound regime.37 To add depth to this article’s analysis of that regime, the next section turns to 
the classic debate in legal theory and monetary theory regarding rules and standards. 
 
                                               
35 ibid, 410. 
36 ibid. 
37 See references at n 18 above. 
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THE CONVERGENCE OF RULES AND STANDARDS 
 
As an example of a rule, consider Britain’s decision in 1819 to return to the gold standard by 
restoring the convertibility of BoE notes into gold at the will of the note-holder. That decision put 
in place a rule which fixed the price of one ounce of gold at £3, 17s, 10 ½d. BoE note-holders now 
knew in advance of presenting notes to the BoE that they were entitled to a fixed amount of gold 
in return. To those who favoured such a rule, fairness, efficiency, and accountability then followed. 
Convertibility promoted fairness by entitling all BoE note-holders to a fixed amount of gold 
without distinction or favour. It promoted efficiency by adding stability to the value of the currency 
so that the commercial community could trade with certainty and predictability. It also promoted 
accountability by encouraging the BoE to balance its creation of notes against its reserves of gold 
rather than create notes subject only to its own sense of prudence. 
 
As a point of contrast to rules and their alleged advantages, we find standards accompanied by 
counter-advantages. As an example of a standard, consider section 11 of the Bank of England Act 
1998, which specifies that an objective of the BoE today is ‘to maintain price stability’. The Act 
does not define ‘price stability’, however, fairness, efficiency, and accountability often follow 
from the absence of precise definitions. The task of determining ‘price stability’ is delegated to 
what many believe to be the expert judgement of the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), 
which exercises its discretion in response to prevailing conditions and in reaction to contingencies 
as they happen. Such an arrangement allows the MPC to promote fairness by adapting monetary 
policy in response to, say, unfavourable employment trends. It enhances efficiency by giving the 
MPC scope to a counter the harm caused by an over- or under-valued currency. The arrangement 
16 
 
also upholds accountability because the MPC’s decisions are subject to oversight by the Treasury 
and parliament.  
 
As these examples suggest, ‘patterned and stereotyped’38 arguments characterise the rules versus 
standards debate.39 Rules promote certainty but are rigid and inflexible; standards promote 
flexibility but are open to manipulation. Rules treat all equally without fear or favour but fail to 
secure justice in particular circumstances; standards respond to the needs of the moment but fail 
to treat like situations alike. Given these back and forth movements, how might we explain the 
choice between rules and standards, between their respective vices and virtues? One explanation 
emphasises the influence of ‘competing values such as certainty or flexibility, uniformity or 
individualization’.40 Another suggests that rules and standards provide certainty in different 
circumstances: rules where actions are simple and stable, standards where ‘the type of action to be 
regulated is complex, changing and involves large economic interests’.41 Or perhaps the 
                                               
38 P. Schlag, ‘Rules and Standards’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 379, 380. 
39 Such ‘patterned’ arguments also characterise the scholarship on rules and discretion in monetary theory. A sample 
of the key texts includes: H. C. Simons, ‘Rules versus authorities in monetary policy’ (1936) 44(1) Journal of 
Political Economy 1; J. B. Taylor, ‘Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice’ (1993) 39 Carnegie-Rochester Series 
on Public Policy 195; J. Viner, ‘The necessary and the desirable range of discretion to be allowed to a monetary 
authority’ in L. B. Yeager (ed.) In Search of a Monetary Constitution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1962) 244. 
40 Schlag, n 38 above, 399. 
41 J. Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 47, 75. In a similar vein, see L. Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 
Duke Law Journal 557. 
17 
 
explanation follows from enforcement strategy: a clear, strict rule facilitates deterrence by helping 
the rule enforcer to prosecute rule breakers; but where the rule enforcer’s strategy involves 
‘negotiation, advice, education, and compromise’, a less rule-like approach may be appropriate.42  
 
A further, well-known explanation advanced by Duncan Kennedy suggests an association between 
rules and standards and the competing political visions of individualism and altruism.43 
Individualism in the sense used by Kennedy entails self-reliance and a clear separation between 
one’s own interests and the interests of others; altruism, by contrast, entails sharing and sacrifice 
for the benefit of one’s community. Kennedy’s point is that arguments for rules resemble those 
favouring individualism and arguments for standards resemble those favouring altruism. Kennedy, 
however, fails to explain the logical necessity for the connection between form and substance, 
rules and individualism, standards and altruism because, as Mark Kelman puts it, ‘there simply is 
no connection’.44 Perhaps though the connection between rules-individualism and standards-
altruism is less a necessity and more a tendency, one with the capacity to inform as well as to 
mislead. As we will see later in this article, the Act of 1844 is a clear example of a rule, one that 
its supporters justified by invoking the norms of self-reliance and individual responsibility. They 
did so in opposition to a standard, one that gave the BoE discretion over money creation, discretion 
that the BoE frequently used to ‘afford assistance’ to others for the benefit of the community.  
                                               
42 J. Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 29, referencing R. Baldwin, ‘Why Rules Don’t 
Work’ (1990) 53 The Modern Law Review 321.  
43 D. Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 
44 M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987) 56. Emphasis 




But, though informative, analysing the Act of 1844 as a clash between rules-individualism and 
standards-altruism misleads as much as it reveals. It misleads because it emphasises a difference 
of kind rather degree, rules versus standards, either one or the other. Why not rules and standards, 
as a series of continua comprising configurations of both?45 A number of legal scholars have 
identified such a possibility, that we view rules and standards less as black-white, bright-line 
‘Platonic essences’46 confronting each other in ‘polar opposition’,47 and more as ‘real world 
phenomena’,48 coloured in shades of grey, as a ‘choice among points on a spectrum with rules at 
one end and standards at the other’.49 If such a possibility has merit, the architects of a monetary 
order face the challenge of achieving the ‘right balance’ between rules and standards, of weighing 
up the trade-offs between the advantages of rules and the advantages of standards in the hope that 
each may prove effective when ‘combined in such a way that each tries to compensate for the 
limitations of the other’.50   
 
However, even where the monetary order’s architects reject ‘rules versus standards’ and embrace 
‘rules and standards’, these architects may face a further challenge, that of rules converging with 
                                               
45 M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (Oxford: OUP, 1992) 199. 
46 M. Coenen, ‘Rules Against Rulification’ (2014) 124 The Yale Law Journal 644, 652 
47 C. R. Sunstein, ‘Problems with Rules’ (1995) 83 California Law Review 953, 961-2. 
48 Coenen, n 46 above, 652. 
49 R. B. Korobkin, ‘Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules and Standards Revisited’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law 
Review 23, 25.  




standards, and vice versa. To see this blending of rules and standards, notice that the application 
of rules tends to require judgement calls and the application of a standard often sees decision-
makers operating as if constrained by rules.51 Consider again the examples from above. On its 
face, the convertibility of BoE notes into gold is a simple and transparent directive. Its prescription 
takes the form of ‘if this, then that’.52 If the note-holder presents a note to the BoE, then the BoE 
must transfer a fixed amount of gold in return. The ‘trigger’–the presentation of the note–sets in 
motion a pre-specified response from the authorities. Often the response really is straightforward: 
the presentation of the note, the transfer of the gold. Sometimes, however, the response is not 
straightforward, because rules do not determine their own application. As Frederick Schauer 
explains, ‘a rule [does] not indicate whether its strictures should be taken as conclusive or subject 
to the making of exceptions should the result indicated by the rule itself appear to the interpreter 
or applier as unpalatable’.53 The great virtue of rules is their rigidity. Yet this very virtue becomes 
a vice when rule-appliers confront emergencies or other contingencies which differ from the 
expectations of rule makers.54 Such situations erode the rigidity of the rule: the applier of the rule 
must now exercise judgement to decide whether to uphold the rule even though so doing will result 
                                               
51 Many legal theorists have noticed this blending of rules and standards. See, for example, Coenen, n 46 above, 
653; Korobkin, n 49 above, 30; F. Schauer, ‘The Convergence of Rules and Standards’ (2003) New Zealand Law 
Review 303; Sunstein, n 47 above, 953. Many monetary theorists have identified the same phenomenon. See, for 
example, J. Bibow, ‘Reflections on the current fashion for central bank independence’ (2004) 28 Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 549, 551; and Whittlesey, n 18, 252.   
52 Schlag, n 38 above, 381. See also W. Twinning and D. Miers, How to Do Things with Rules (Cambridge: CUP, 5th 
ed, 2010) 90-91.  
53 Schauer, n 51 above, 313. 
54 D. Kennedy, ‘Legal Formality’ (1973) The Journal of Legal Studies 351, 380.  
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in unjust or absurd consequences. In 1797, the authorities in Britain had to make exactly this 
judgement call. Should they maintain the convertibility of BoE notes into gold at a fixed price of 
£3, 17s, 10 ½d? Or should they suspend convertibility given the ongoing hostilities with France? 
In the event, the authorities chose the latter course. But the point is this: even when confronted 
with a simple and transparent rule, the authorities still had to exercise judgement. 
 
Although exceptions turn rules into standards, it is often also true that decision-makers with 
discretion act as if bound by rules. Recall the Bank of England Act 1998 which gives the BoE the 
objective of securing price stability. The advantage of a legal pronouncement such as this is the 
flexibility it gives to monetary experts to respond to unforeseen contingencies. But the objective 
of securing price stability fails to specify how the monetary authority will conduct monetary 
policy. Constrained only by a vague objective, what is to stop the monetary authority from 
adopting random, ad hoc policies or from becoming vulnerable to popular sentiments and interest 
group manipulation?55 Monetary authorities nonetheless tend to argue that their approach to 
working under a standard such as ‘price stability’ tends to be structured and systematic rather than 
random and ad hoc. Such a structure might take the form of a predetermined plan which weighs 
reported inflation and economic growth against targets for economic growth and inflation. When 
inflation is above target, the monetary authority increases interest rates; when growth is below 
target, the monetary authority lowers interest rates. Either way, the authority reacts to the trigger–
the gap between reality and the target–with an automatic rule-like response, and by so doing 
                                               
55 These fears underpin the ‘credible commitment mechanism’ approach. See n 21 above.  
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attempts to promote stable prices.56 Other less automatic, more flexible responses are also 
possible.57 The point to note is the degree of overlap between standards and rules. Despite starting 
with a firm line between rules and standards that line soon loses its sharpness amidst debates over 
the degree of discretion held by decision-makers.            
 
 
THE BANK OF ENGLAND’S ‘OPPOSITE AND INCONSISTENT DUTIES’  
 
This section continues to explore the theme of the blurred boundary between rules and standards, 
and does so by using another example of a standard–the BoE’s monetary policy of the 1830s–
which came to take on rule-like characteristics. This approach to monetary policy is known today 
as the so-called ‘Palmer rule’, after the Governor of the BoE at the time, Horsely Palmer.58 
Although the Palmer rule showcases the convergence in practice of rules and standards, its 
perceived inadequacies as a means of constraining the BoE’s powers over money creation also 
                                               
56 The predetermined plan described here roughly corresponds to the so-called ‘Taylor Rule.’ See Taylor, n 39 
above.  
57 See, for example, B. S. Bernanke and F. S. Mishkin, ‘Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary 
Policy?’ (1997) 11(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 97. 
58 Horsely Palmer (1779-1858) was the Governor of the Bank of England from 1830-1833 and the Deputy Governor 
of the Bank of England from 1828-1830. He became a Director of the Bank of England in 1811. See J. K. 




explain the desire that led many to put their faith in clear, rigid rules such as the Bank Charter Act 
of 1844. 
 
Our starting point for understanding the Palmer rule and its relationship to the Act of 1844 is the 
framework drawn from David Hume, which provides the rationale for a gold standard monetary 
regime.59 Working under the assumption that gold is the only money, Hume’s classic model tells 
us that when gold flows into a country, the money supply increases and that money finds its way 
into the pockets of the general population who then spend more on goods and services. Following 
this increase in demand, goods and services increase in price. As these goods and services increase 
in price, they become less competitive relative to cheaper goods and services elsewhere in the 
world that have not seen the same price increases. The inflow of gold that led to an increase in 
prices will then reverse itself as gold flows overseas to take advantage of the cheaper goods and 
services found there. Domestic prices then start to decline before the whole process repeats. 
Hume’s conclusion is that this monetary system based on gold self-adjusts automatically provided 
governments do not meddle in the flows of gold that settle the balance of payments between 
countries.       
    
                                               
59 D. Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (1752), Book II, Essay V, ‘On the Balance of Trade.’ For 
commentary on Hume’s ideas on money, see D. Vickers, Studies in The Theory of Money, 1690-1776 (New York: 




Matters become more complex when paper money is introduced into the model. For the theory to 
continue to apply in this context, the notes issued by the monetary authority must increase and 
contract in proportion to the flows of gold into and out of the country. Assigning the note-holder 
the right to have the note converted into gold on demand is one device for holding in-check the 
creation of paper money. It does so through a rule of the type that we saw earlier: the presentation 
of the note triggers the transfer of gold. But note a proviso: the monetary authority, such as the 
BoE, can only honour its obligation to convert the note on demand provided its reserve of gold is 
sufficient to cover the size of its note issue. This proviso is crucial because it, in effect, allows a 
simple and transparent rule to morph into a standard. The right of the note-holder is only secure 
provided the BoE judges carefully the extent of its note issue, so as to maintain an appropriate ratio 
of notes to gold reserves. But therein lies the problem. How ought the BoE to judge an appropriate 
ratio of notes to reserves?  
 
Horsely Palmer fashioned rule-like guidelines to help the BoE make this judgement call. Palmer’s 
guidelines recommended that, when gold was just about to leave the country, the BoE should 
divide its assets into a gold reserve equal to one-third of its note and deposit liabilities, and interest 
earning securities (such as government debt and bills of exchange) equal to two-thirds of these 
liabilities. Thereafter, the BoE should hold its securities at a constant level and allow its note and 
deposit liabilities to vary in response to inflows and outflows of gold. Courtesy of these rule-like 
guidelines, Palmer provided the BoE with a predetermined plan. In response to a trigger–inflows 
and outflows of gold–the BoE ought to hold its securities constant and allow its note and deposit 




In practice, however, the BoE struggled to adhere to Palmer’s rule-like guidelines. According to 
the leading figure of the currency school of monetary theorists, Lord Overstone,60 the BoE 
struggled to do so because it was unable to resolve the dilemma between its ‘opposite and 
inconsistent duties’.61 On the one hand, the BoE issued banknotes that it was duty bound to convert 
into gold on demand. On the other, the BoE also performed other banking activities, such as 
discounting bills of exchange, which merchants and other bankers believed the BoE ought to 
continue to perform during moments of commercial pressure. 62 By providing such accommodation 
even though gold was flowing overseas–as the BoE had done during the crises 1825-26, 1837, and 
1839–the BoE increased its holding of bills of exchange even through Palmer’s guidelines 
                                               
60 Samuel Jones Loyd (1796-1883) was a banker who on his elevation to the peerage in 1850 became Lord 
Overstone. The currency school refers to the group of writers in the late 1830s and early 1840s who sought a means 
of ensuring that a paper currency behaved in the manner called for by Hume’s model. For an overview of nineteenth 
century monetary theory, see A. Arnon, Monetary Theory and Policy from Hume and Smith to Wicksell: money, 
credit, and the economy (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
61 S. Jones Loyd, Reflections Suggested by a Perusal of Mr. J. Horsely Palmer’s Pamphlet (London: Pelham 
Richardson, 1837) 48. In addition to the dilemma described in this section, much of the contemporary debate on the 
BoE’s practice in the 1830s focused on the distinction between bank notes and bank deposits. Palmer treated these 
two types of liability as equally important. Currency school thinkers such as Overstone privileged bank notes over 
bank deposits, and criticized the BoE in the 1830s for failing to counter the fact that, when people exported gold 
from Britain, the BoE’s note issue did not contract to the same extent because some of the reduction in the BoE’s 
liabilities fell on the deposits it held for the public.  
62 On this tension between the BoE’s responsibilities, see J. Clapham, The Bank of England: A History (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1945), 162-4; F. Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy, 1797-1875 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1965), 258; T. Alborn, Conceiving Companies: Joint-stock politics in Victorian England (London: 
Routledge, 1998) 55; and G. Ingham, Capitalism Divided (London: Macmillan, 1984) 236-7.  
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recommended maintaining these securities at a constant level. This inconsistency compelled 
Overstone to conclude that the BoE’s note issuing function and its banking function were not only 
‘perfectly distinct from each other, but in many respects of so conflicting a nature, that it seems 
hardly possible that the administration of the two can be safely confided to the same hands’.63 As 
Overstone’s fellow currency school member, Robert Torrens,64 put it, 
 
If they [the directors of the BoE] could be prevailed upon to attend with strictness to their 
essential duty of regulating their issues by the course of the foreign exchanges, they would 
never be called upon to perform the superfluous duty of watching over and supporting 
commercial credit.65   
  
In the 1830s, however, the BoE tended to watch over and support commercial credit on so many 
occasions that Overstone described Palmer as ‘standing upon piles of Bank Notes and supporting 
with Atlantean shoulders broad the vast fabric of Commercial Credit’.66 Convertibility was not 
suspended but, as Overstone argued,  
 
                                               
63 Jones Loyd, n 61 above, 43.  
64 Colonel Robert Torrens (1780-1864) was a Royal Marines officer and later an MP. His son, also Robert Torrens, 
introduced the Torrens system of land registration.  
65 R. Torrens, A Letter to the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Melbourne (London: Longman, 1837) 44. 
66 Lord Overstone to G. W. Norman, 3 April 1837 in D. P. O’Brien, Correspondence of Overstone, volume I 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1971) 223. 
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Unless the paper-circulation of the country be regulated by a fixed rule, not fitful and 
capricious in its operation, but constant and invariable, its convertibility at all times cannot 
be effectually secured, and the maintenance of the value of the currency, as measured by its 
ancient metallic standard, must become precarious and uncertain.67  
 
What Overstone classified as ‘capricious’ Palmer saw as a discretionary response to ‘special 
circumstances’.68 A standard allows decision-makers licence to adapt policy to unforeseen 
emergencies and contingencies. Though rule-like, Palmer’s guidelines were self-imposed and, 
crucially, had built into them exceptions ‘under special circumstances’.69 Yet it was precisely 
Palmer’s willingness to acknowledge the ‘special circumstances of the case’70 and to extend 
assistance to commerce that led to Overstone’s concern about the ‘precarious and uncertain’ status 
of convertibility. Special circumstances might multiply and the BoE might find ‘that it is extremely 
difficult, as well as unpopular, to refuse the demands which are made upon her; and, therefore, 
easily convinces herself that it is impossible’.71 The Act of 1844 attempted to tip the balance 
between the BoE’s conflicting duties back in the direction of what the currency school called its 
‘essential duty’ to maintain convertibility, and it attempted to do so through a rule that limited the 
freedom of the BoE to create paper money. It is to the Act of 1844 that we now turn.  
                                               
67 S. Jones Loyd, Remarks on the Management of the Circulation (London: Pelham Richardson, 1840) 91-92. 
68 Testimony of J. H. Palmer, Report from the Select Committee on Bank of Issue (HC, 1840, 602-IV) Q. 1419.  
69 Testimony of J. H. Palmer, Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the expediency of renewing the Charter of 
the Bank of England (HC, 1832, 722-VI) Q. 1142-1148. 
70 Testimony of Palmer, n 68 above, Q.1261. 




THE ACT OF 1844 AND THE BENEFITS OF A ‘STRICT AND JUDICIOUS RULE’  
 
By stressing the BoE’s ‘essential duty’ to convertibility over its ‘superfluous duty’ to the 
commercial community, the currency school followed the famous Bullion Report of 1810. That 
Report had argued that the loss of convertibility meant the absence of ‘That natural check or control 
… which maintains the value of money, and, by the permanency of the common standard of value, 
secures the substantial justice and faith of monied contracts and obligations between man and 
man’.72  It is these two aims–supporting the value of money and securing relations between 
creditors and debtors–that also come to the fore in the writings by currency school figures such as 
Robert Torrens and Lord Overstone. According to Overstone,  
 
In adopting a paper circulation we must unavoidably depend for a maintenance of its due 
value upon the adoption of a strict and judicious rule for the regulation of its amount. Upon 
such maintenance of its value depends the price of all commodities; the relative situation of 
the debtor and creditor classes of the community.73  
   
The ‘strict and judicious rule’ Overstone had in mind arrived courtesy of the Act of 1844. That 
Act introduced a regime in accordance with which the quantity of BoE notes was intended to vary 
in response to flows of gold into and out of the country. Towards achieving that objective, the Act 
                                               
72 Report from the Select Committee on the High Price of Gold Bullion (HC, 1810, 349-III), 74.  
73 S. Jones Loyd, Further Reflections on the State of the Currency (London: Pelham Richardson, 1837) 35-36. 
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introduced a novel institutional arrangement which saw the creation of two departments within 
BoE, the issue department and the banking department.74 All of the BoE notes created by the issue 
department had to be backed by their equivalent in gold coin or gold bullion, with the exception 
of a £14 million issue backed by securities such as government debt.75 With the issue department 
responsible for the note-issue, the banking department accepted deposits, advanced loans, and 
discounted bills of exchange. Through these arrangements, the Act’s promoters hoped to guide the 
behaviour of the BoE by curtailing its discretion over money creation and they hoped to guide the 
behaviour of other bankers too, by ‘strengthening the hands of the Bank’76 in its bid to curb the 
extent to which it supported the commercial community during times of crisis. As one 
commentator explains, ‘It was a principal aim of the Act […] that the note issue could be increased 
only if the Issue Department’s [gold] reserve rose’.77 In keeping with that aim, a flow of gold 
overseas deprived the issue department of the gold it needed to back the creation of BoE notes and, 
                                               
74 On the history of the plan of separating the BoE into two departments, see Arnon, n 60 above, chapter 8. See also 
J. K. Horsefield, ‘The Origins of the Bank Charter Act, 1844’ (Nov., 1944) Economica 180. 
75 Bank Charter Act 1844, s. II. Moreover, the Act, at Sections X-XIII, only permitted provincial banks issuing notes 
on 6 May 1844 to continue to do so, and only on the condition that (i) the bank did not exceed its average issue as of 
the twelve weeks ending 26 April 1844; and (ii) the bank’s issue remained continuous (i.e. the bank could not 
resume a lapsed issue). See Clapham, n 62 above, 183. Even prior to these restrictions, the note issue of provincial 
banks had been in decline. See R. Cameron, ‘England, 1750-1844’ in R. Cameron, O. Crisp, H. T. Patrick, and R. 
Tilly (eds) Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) 15, 42.  
Separate legislation, enacted in 1845 and similar in spirit to the Act of 1844, applied to Scotland and Ireland.  
76 Jones Loyd, n 67 above, 53 
77 M. Collins, Money and Banking in the UK: A History (1988) 175. 
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with the note issue limited, the banking department had a reason to refuse some or all requests for 
assistance from the commercial community.  
 
In contrast to the issue department, the banking department lacked the power to create BoE notes 
in any circumstances. Its reserve of notes consisted of those notes created by the issue department 
minus those in circulation. As would become clear in the decades after 1844, the banking 
department had considerable discretion over how it might use that reserve of notes.78 But the 
banking department could not augment its note reserve by creating additional notes at will as the 
BoE had done in the 1830s. Such a constraint deliberately disciplined the banking department 
because, from the notes it held in reserve, it had to cover those liabilities owed to the BoE’s 
depositors as well as all requests for discounts or advances or both from the commercial 
community. It is here that the ‘Bank screw’ comes to the fore. To protect its limited reserve of 
notes when gold was flowing overseas, the banking department had to ration access to it. It did so 
by turning its ‘screw’, through raising the rate at which it sold its notes in return for bills of 
exchange. Such an operation was, in theory, a ‘mechanical’,79 ‘automatic’80 rule-like process: if 
gold flowed overseas, then the banking department applied its ‘screw’ so that, with ‘hydraulic 
                                               
78 The banking department also had considerable discretion over deposit creation because it could create deposits at 
will subject only to convertibility. The contrast between the Act of 1844’s tight control of the note issue and the 
absence of any direct control of deposit creation was a source of controversy in the debate between the currency 
school and the banking school. See Arnon n 60 above, 187-247. 
79 Testimony of Lord Overstone, Report from the Select Committee on Bank Acts (HC, 1857, 220-X) Q. 3895. 
 




smoothness’,81 the discount rate increased as gold reserves decreased. If such a manoeuvre failed 
to curb demand for the banking department’s notes so that its note reserve started to decline 
towards zero, it might decide to cease discounting altogether. As one of the BoE’s directors, J.G. 
Hubbard, explained  
 
the change which has been affected by the Act of 1844 has been this, that the Bank of 
England now has no such unfailing supply of notes; the Bank of England, as a bank, has 
limits to its means … and it cannot undertake, and does not undertake, and it is quite right 
that other banking bodies in London and the country should understand that it does not 
pretend to be able at any moment to turn into cash for them the Exchequer bills and Consols, 
or other Government securities, [or bills of exchange] when they ought, with due prudence 
and proper management, to have kept the cash themselves.82  
 
Such a regime meant bankers and merchants and manufacturers knew–or ought to know–that at 
some point the BoE would have to withhold access to its notes from them.83 Now unable to call 
upon the BoE for assistance, the mercantile world would need to adjust its behaviour accordingly. 
Torrens saw the system working in the following way: when the banking department turned its 
‘screw’ tighter, ‘the several banks of deposit would have the amounts of their available cash 
diminished, and would immediately perceive the necessity of limiting the amount of their 
                                               
81 D. O’Brien, ‘The Lender-of-Last-Resort Concept in Britain’ (2003) 35(1) History of Political Economy 1, 13. 
82 Testimony of Hubbard, n 5 above, Q. 2629. 
83 See E. Wood, English Theories of Central Bank Control, 1819-1858 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1939) 113.   
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discounts and credits in like proportion’.84  Put another way, if bankers did not ‘immediately 
perceive the necessity’ of disciplining their lending by ‘timely precaution and restraint’;85 if they 
failed to respect this ‘rule of prudence’;86 if they ignored the reality that ‘their sole reliance now 
must be only on their own till’,87 then, according to Overstone, ‘Monetary pressure really render 
good service to the community – by exterminating noxious weeds and destroying the seeds of 
spreading mischief’.88 As Overstone explains, ‘When the transactions of trade and commerce are 
in a sound state – a temporary pressure on the monetary system produces no evil effect’89 because 
banks and others would respond to the signals sent by the level of the banking department’s reserve 
by standing ready to meet their obligations with their own reserves. The ‘unsoundness’ underlying 
those enterprises that could not do so was then exposed to their creditors. In a context influenced 
by the early Victorian doctrine of atonement, the penalty for the non-compliance of these ‘noxious 
weeds’ was their ‘extermination’ via bankruptcy.90       
  
                                               
84 R. Torrens, An Inquiry into the … Renewal of the Charter of the Bank of England (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 
1844) 29.  
85 Anon. [S. Jones Loyd and R. Torrens], The Petition of the Merchants, Bankers, and Traders of London, against 
the Bank Charter Act; with comments on each clause (London: Pelham Richardson, 1847) 18. 
86 J. E. Cairnes, An Examination into the Principles of Currency (London: Ridgeway, 1854) 16, quoting from The 
Times, October 1847. 
87 S. Neave, Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts (HC 1857, 220-X), Appendix, 5. 
88 Lord Overstone to G. C. Lewis, 6 Nov. 1856 in D. P. O’Brien, Correspondence of Overstone, volume ii 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1971) 682.  
89 Lord Overstone to G. W. Norman, 4 Nov. 1856 in O’Brien, ibid, 679. 
90 B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement (Oxford: OUP, 1988). 
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ENFORCING THE ACT: ‘GRIEVOUS AND UNNECESSARY EVILS OF A 
COLLATERAL KIND’  
 
Harvest failures in England and Ireland in 1846 saw the price of wheat rise and imports increase. 
Gold flowed overseas to pay for these imports and in the spring of 1847 the BoE raised its discount 
rate. Doing so increased the cost of borrowing money at the tail end of the railway boom; it hit 
hardest those struggling to meet calls from railway companies on partly paid shares.91 Yet gold 
continued to flow overseas. The BoE responded by increasing its rate further and by reaffirming 
its decision to buy only the most desirable securities.92 Such measures added to the burden of those 
with obligations to honour. In August 1847 London’s merchants petitioned Parliament to complain 
‘That this pressure has manifested itself in the fact of the suspension of the ordinary facilities of 
business – such as the discounting legitimate commercial bills of unquestionable credit and 
solvency, and the withholding other ordinary monetary accommodation’.  The petitioners claimed 
that the BoE had a responsibility to give ‘temporary aid, if called for by the mercantile body at 
such periods of emergency’,93 and yet the Act of 1844 prevented the BoE from doing so.   
 
                                               
91 Campbell, n 18 above. See also R. Dornbusch and J. A. Frenkel, ‘The Gold Standard and the Bank of England in 
the Crisis of 1847’ in M. D. Bordo and A. J. Schwartz (eds) A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-
1931 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984) 234-237.  
92 See R. G. Hawtrey, A Century of Bank Rate (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1962) 22 and Fetter, n 62 above, 
201-211. On the situation in Ireland, see Charles Reid, ‘Laissez-faire, the Irish famine, and British financial crisis’, 
(2016) 69(2) Economic History Review 411.   
93 Petitioners quoted in Anon. (Jones Loyd and Torrens), n 85 above, 4. 
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Although the Government was unmoved by the petition and held firm in its support of the Act, by 
October another deputation of London bankers and merchants met with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and ‘implored him to take steps to remove the legal restriction on the Bank’s issues’.94 
On 25 October 1847 that pressure produced the outcome desired by the petitioners. In a letter from 
the Treasury to the BoE, the Government recommended that the BoE ‘enlarge the amount of their 
discounts and advances, upon approved security’, adding that, ‘[i]f this course should lead to any 
infringement of the existing law’ the Government would protect the BoE by submitting a bill of 
indemnity to parliament. 95 The Government confirmed the ‘extraordinary and temporary’ nature 
of the measure by asking the BoE’s directors to ‘reduce as soon as possible the amount of their 
notes, if any extraordinary issues should take place, within the limits prescribed by law’.96 Upon 
receipt of the letter, the BoE ‘immediately began to lend more liberally’ and, with ‘the BoE no 
longer bound by the Act, the panic subsided’.97  
 
                                               
94 W.T.C. King, History of the London Discount Market (London: Routledge, 1936) 146-7. On the various 
deputations that tried to persuade the government to suspend the Act in 1847, see Morning Post, 20 October 1847; 
Bankers’ Magazine, November 1847; A. E. Feaveryear, The Pound Sterling. A History of English Money (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1931) 284; and S. E. Thomas, The Rise and Growth of Joint Stock Banking (London: Pitman, 1934) 437, 
439 and 446. 
95  See Editorial, ‘The Triumph of the Banking Principle’, Bankers’ Magazine, November 1847, 534. The 
government set a minimum rate of interest on the BoE’s discounts and advances of 8 per cent. The same remedy was 
adopted in 1857 and 1866. Only in 1857 did the BoE actually issue the additional notes.  
96 ibid. 
97 King, n 94 above, 147.  
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Shortly thereafter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Wood, explained to Parliament his 
decision to suspend the Act of 1844. The Act was, he said, ‘the result of human wisdom’, and so, 
though it upheld the value of the currency, it was ‘not indispensable to carry into strict execution 
under all circumstances …’.98 As an alternative to the ‘strict execution’ of the Act, Wood was open 
to the ‘exceptional course’ of suspending it even though so doing represented a volte-face in 
government policy. After all, Wood had spent most of 1847 declaring that increasing the note issue 
was ‘contrary to the law’ and that the monetary pressure would be even worse ‘if matters were not 
allowed to take their course’.99 During 1847 his seemingly unshakable resolve to uphold the Act 
of 1844 had even led to cuts in famine relief spending in Ireland.100 What then accounts for his 
willingness to suspend the Act in the autumn of 1847? In search of an answer this part of the 
Article explores the assets held by those who petitioned the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the value 
of which was threatened by the turning of the ‘Bank screw’.  
 
Characterising the late eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth was the proliferation of 
‘property in … the unsecured but contracted-for performance of executory commercial promises 
…’.101 This form of property drew its value not from a right to a specific material object–such as 
land, factories, machinery, or, indeed, gold coin–but from a claim to future revenues. However, 
these abstract, intangible property claims were, and still are, intensely vulnerable. They depend on 
                                               
98 Chancellor of the Exchequer (Charles Wood), HC Deb vol 95 col 377 30 Nov. 1847.  
99 Quoted in the Morning Post, 20 October 1847. 
100 Reid, n 92 above, 420-421. 
101 R. Gordon, ‘Paradoxical Property’ in J. Brewer and S. Staves (eds) Early Modern Conceptions of Property 
(London: Routledge, 1996) 95, 99. 
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contractual promises to pay, and these contractual promises to pay in turn depend on the realisation 
of expectations. Where the expectation–the bet on future productivity–is misplaced, contractual 
promises unravel.102  
 
The monetary architecture created by the Act of 1844 deliberately increased the likelihood of these 
promises unravelling. It did so by encouraging the BoE to limit the quantity of bills of exchange 
that it discounted.103 Under the Act, a flow of gold overseas prevented the issue department from 
creating BoE notes. Under these conditions, the banking department rationed those notes it held 
by raising its discount rate: on 1 January 1847 the BoE’s minimum discount rate stood at 3 per 
cent. By the middle of January it had increased to 3.5 per cent; by April to 4 per cent; by August 
to 5 per cent; and by October to 8 per cent.104 By turning the ‘Bank screw’ and increasing the 
expense for bankers seeking to discount bills of exchange, the BoE withheld access to its notes 
from those unable or unwilling to meet its increased rate. Moreover, in the background hung the 
threat that the BoE might cease to discount altogether. The Act of 1844 placed a limit on the BoE’s 
capacity to create paper money. If the banking department’s reserve of notes fell to zero–it 
decreased throughout 1847, from over £8 million in January 1847 to £1.5 million on the eve of the 
                                               
102 See, for example, Gordon, ibid; P. Ireland, I. Grigg-Spall and D. Kelly, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of Modern 
Company Law’ (1987) 14(1) Journal of Law and Society 149; and P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979) 102-112.  
103 Hawtrey, n 92 above, 7-8 and 21.  
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Act’s suspension105–it would have had no choice but to stop lending.106 No wonder then that those 
who depended on discounts to help them bridge the gap between their assets and their liabilities 
described the Act of 1844 as an ‘iron-cage’107 and ‘cast-iron system’108 built on a ‘denial of 
discounts’109 where ‘[t]he rule is, no gold, no paper; no paper, no money; no money, no discounts, 
except on terms of extortion’.110   
  
The petition to Parliament from London’s merchants in August 1847 was provoked by the BoE’s 
refusal to discount ‘commercial bills of the first credit’ except ‘at rates of interest hitherto unknown 
in this country’.111 Those who agreed to pay such rates saw their ‘legitimate gains’ ‘plundered … 
by extortionate discounts on account of the statutable scarcity of legal tender’.112 Those who 
refused to accept the BoE’s terms still had to find income from somewhere to cover their current 
liabilities, such as those owed by bankers to their depositors and by manufacturers to their 
workforce. A prudent banker might respond to the scarcity of legal tender by heeding the advice 
of the currency school and adjusting the ratio between their liabilities and reserves. They could do 
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so by restricting ‘the accommodation previously granted to their commercial connections’113 such 
as merchants and manufacturers. ‘[D]enied their usual facilities’, these merchants and 
manufacturers were ‘compelled to diminish the number of their operatives and … to sell goods at 
a ruinous sacrifice, for the purpose of discharging engagements contracted in times of less 
difficulty’.114 Yet if others without the income to cover short-term liabilities opted to sell property 
too, ‘the most general and frightful decline in the value of commodities’ would then follow.115 In 
the aftermath of the crisis of the autumn of 1847, one critic of the Act of 1844 speculated that the 
depreciation in the value of property ‘probably would not be overstated at from 10 to 20 per cent.’, 
‘extending over all merchandise, stocks, railroad shares, &c’.116 These ‘forced sales of produce, 
and other property’ compelled merchants and manufactures to incur ‘immense losses’, which then 
resulted in further forced sales.117 At some point, these merchants and manufacturers would find 
it difficult ‘amounting, perhaps, to an impossibility, of obtaining the means of discharging 
stipulated payments’.118 With many ‘unable to fulfil their engagements’,119 ‘[s]ome firms … 
stopped payment: their failure involved more or less deeply many other firms which had trusted 
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them’.120 The result was a system ‘wantonly involving hundreds of good men in bankruptcy, and 
throwing out of employment millions of men’,121 all because ‘the Bank of England has not a given 
amount of bullion in its coffers’.122 These apprehensions reflect the facts: bankruptcies jumped 
from 1,533 in 1846 to over 2,000 in 1848;123 and unemployment in Manchester during the first six 
months of 1848 is estimated to have reached 18 per cent.124 
 
Perhaps some of the firms denied access to credit were the ‘noxious weeds’ Overstone was content 
to see ‘exterminated’ during periods of monetary pressure.125 Moreover, the fall in the value of 
property during 1847 was exactly what Hume’s model called for: as the currency school’s leading 
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lights argued during the crisis, only a fall in the price of domestic commodities would attract gold 
back to the country. Yet even if ‘those houses that were notoriously weak had gone down’, 
supporters of the Act still recognised that ‘the pressure began to break what you may term solvent 
houses, and to occasion others to sacrifice their property to an enormous extent’.126 Joseph Pease, 
a coal mine owner from the county of Durham, agreed and added, in response to the question ‘Do 
you think even solvent houses have suffered?’, ‘I have no doubt of it ... generally, from the 
circumstances under which they have carried on business, the high rate of discount, and the failures 
and losses, and the great depreciation of stock, they have very bad accounts’.127 Pease also stressed 
that it was the working classes who were least well placed to escape from harm and who had 
suffered the most, before concluding,  
 
I am really of opinion that there never was a greater amount of distress amongst all classes, 
and borne with more admirable fortitude, than that which existed in the [autumn of 1847]. 
That which has come under my own notice, going amongst thousands of my work-people, 
is harrowing to the extreme. The amount of Sunday clothes in pledge I never saw equalled 
in the same degree: food has swallowed up everything with the want of work.128 
 
                                               
126 Testimony of C. Turner, First Report from the Secret Committee on Commercial Distress (HC, 1847-48, 395-
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The line between Overstone’s ‘noxious weeds’ and those firms in a ‘sound state’ is difficult to 
draw ex ante. The dynamics of a crisis constantly shift the boundary, often causing ‘grievous and 
unnecessary Evils of a collateral Kind’129 as a growing number of firms are caught on the wrong 
side of the line. Forced sales lead to losses, which induce contractual defaults; those who would 
otherwise have been able to pay off debts default too, shifting another round of losses on to 
contractual counter-parties; lay-offs then follow and eventually, insolvency. This produces further 
job losses, and the scenes Pease described as ‘harrowing to the extreme’. The dilemma facing the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in the autumn of 1847 was whether to allow these harrowing scenes 
of ‘grievous and unnecessary Evils’ to multiply, or whether to enforce the Act and proclaim ‘Perish 
commerce, live the Act of 1844!’130  
 
THE ‘HORNS OF THE DILEMMA’ AND THE CRISIS OF 2008  
 
The rule-like structure of the Act of 1844 wobbled at the moment when a group of merchants and 
bankers petitioned the Chancellor of the Exchequer asking him to suspend the Act. It wobbled 
because rules do not determine their own application. The Chancellor had to decide whether to 
apply the Act regardless of circumstances and consequences, or whether to suspend the Act when 
turning the ‘Bank screw’ threatened consequences intolerable even to the Government. 
Enforcement left many facing insolvency; suspension extended credit. Enforcement promoted 
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values such as self-reliance and self-discipline, but it left vulnerable the assets, the property in 
expectations, held by the country’s banks. Suspension dispelled the ‘Fear of Mills being 
stopped’131 but it threatened the convertibility of bank notes into gold.  
 
In that moment of crisis in the autumn of 1847, the ‘horns of the dilemma’132 facing the public 
authorities revealed the inescapable role of public authority in the construction of a monetary 
order.133 During and after the events of 2008 the authorities in the US and in the EU had to grapple 
with that same dilemma in a context also shaped by a rule-based monetary order. As we saw in the 
introduction, the design of these rules–section 13(3) of the FRA and Articles 123 and 125 of the 
TFEU–in part responds to the importance these jurisdictions attach to sound money. When the 
viability of the credit created by the banking system was at stake, however, the authorities had to 
reassess the meaning and purpose of these rules. In the US, creative ‘legal maneuvering’134 by the 
Federal Reserve allowed it to adopt a  flexible interpretation of its then powers under section 13(3) 
of the FRA, a provision which allowed the Fed to extend loans to non-bank financial institutions 
provided these loans were ‘secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank’. The provision 
granted the Fed considerable discretion to weigh up whether a loan was ‘secured to [its] 
satisfaction’. But the nature of the support offered to Bear Stearns and AIG in 2008 saw the Fed 
                                               
131 Testimony of J. Morris (Governor of the BoE), Report from the Secret Committee of the House of Lords, 
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accept collateral of no value at all. That interpretation freed the Fed to support institutions which 
would otherwise have collapsed but at the cost of leaving the transaction looking, in the words of 
one commentator, ‘legally dubious’.135 
 
Similar controversies mark Europe’s response to the 2008 crisis and its aftermath. Article 123 of 
the TFEU prohibits the ECB from providing ‘overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility’ 
to EU member states; similarly, Article 125 declares that ‘the Union shall not be liable for or 
assume the commitments of’ its member states. Both Articles 123 and 125 have strong rule-like 
characteristics: they fix ex ante the limits of the ECB’s obligations. And yet in the context of the 
sovereign debt crisis the EU applied these rules in such a way that governments and, indirectly, 
the banks bailed-out by these sovereigns received the support that these rules appear to prohibit. 
Although Article 125, for example, prohibits the EU from assuming responsibility for the debt of 
member states, it is silent on whether the member states can use an international treaty to establish 
a new autonomous institution–such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)–that might then 
make loans to or purchase on primary and secondary markets the debt of member states. Even 
though the European Court of Justice sanctioned this legal manoeuvre as a legitimate means of 
crisis management, many scholars view it as ‘legally dubious’ for failing to accord with the spirit 
of the TFEU.136  
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Legally dubious to some, a ‘creative moment’ to others,137 intensely controversial to all, some 
scholars have observed the extent to which the authorities in both jurisdictions searched for a legal 
basis to support their actions.138 As Bruno De Witte writes of the EU, ‘even when they felt pressed 
for urgent action, [EU institutions and Member States] always tried to respect existing constraints 
of EU law (or national constitutional law), even when they made creative use of the instruments 
available in the legal toolbox’.139 Such legal creativity marks a point of contrast with the 1840s. 
Rather than try to stretch or side-step the Act of 1844, the Government cut to the chase and 
suspended the limitation on BoE’s note issuing powers. But despite this difference, notice a thread 
connecting the 1840s to the present. Whether the monetary authorities stretched, side-stepped, or 
suspended legal directives, such actions cast doubt on the viability of ex ante, preventative legal 
measures. Contemporaries described the suspension of the Act of 1844 as a ‘shameful’140 breach 
of ‘constitutional laws’,141 which ‘has produced on the public mind a want of confidence in the 
existing law’142 and allowed the Act’s opponents ‘to pounce on what seems the carcass of a dead 
law’.143 In a similar vein, scholars have described the Fed’s actions during the crisis in the US as 
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‘an enormous violation of the rule of law’,144 as ‘legal trickery’,145 and as ‘beyond the scope of the 
Fed’s … authority’.146 In a like manner, commentators in Europe fear that, in the euro crisis, 
‘illegality has followed illegality’,147 threatening law’s ‘integrity’148 and ‘legitimacy’,149 
forewarning the ‘demise of the rule of law’.150 
 
Interlaced with these fears for the viability of monetary rules is another thread, one which traces 
discomfort with the discretion at the disposal of the authorities. In accounts of the euro crisis, such 
discretion emerges when ‘[l]awyers-practitioners and academics’ support political actors ‘by 
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taking the letter of the law so lightly as to run afoul of it’.151 It follows that ‘law can no longer be 
understood as a body of rules’;152 instead when ‘interpreted flexibly’153 only ‘a thin veneer of 
legality on the political’154 remains, exposing ‘standards which are sufficiently vague to empower 
policymakers to act according to their understanding of what needs to be done’.155 A new style of 
‘discretionary governance’156 emerges; rule by ‘political expediency’157 becomes the norm ‘almost 
irrespective of, and perhaps entirely unconstrained by, what the Treaties say’.158 With the loss of 
‘a set of rules that constrain the actions of politically responsive decision-makers’,159 other losses 
follow, including the benefits of a rule-bound monetary order. Absent the prohibition on financial 
support, how will sovereigns and their banks learn to act with financial prudence and assume 
                                               
151 Joerges, n 149 above, 999-1000. 
152 ibid, 1014. 
153 N. Scicluna, ‘Integration through the disintegration of law? The ECB and EU constitutionalism in the crisis’ 
(2018) 25(12) Journal of European Public Policy 1874, 1883. 
154 Joerges, n 149 above, 1014, quoting D. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2006) 103. 
155 Joerges, ibid, 1014. 
156 C. Joerges and C. Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘European Studies and the European Crisis: Legal and Political Science 
between Critique and Complacency’ (2017) 23(1-2) European Law Journal 118, 120. 
157 De Witte, n 136 above, 451. 
158 G. Beck, ‘The legal reasoning of the court of justice and the euro crisis – the flexibility of the court’s cumulative 
approach and the Pringle case’ (2013) 20(4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 635, 638. 
159 R. Bellamy and A. Weale, ‘Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and 
the normative logic of two-level games’ (2015) 22(2) Journal of European Public Policy 257, 259 
46 
 
responsibility for their own solvency?160 And how will the monetary authorities guard against 
superficially attractive but ultimately short-sighted support for special interests?  
   
These concerns also surface in scholarship on the US response to the 2008 crisis, where the 
problem of short-sighted support for special interests follows from ‘The tendency for regulatory 
officials to leave government posts for lucrative positions in the private financial industry’.161 
When that happens, writes Timothy Canova, ‘Policy naturally comes to reflect the bargain of the 
moment between the most powerful private interests’.162 The ‘bargain of the moment’ during and 
after 2008 secured ‘A bailout for Wall Street before Main Street’, one made possible by the Fed 
stumbling ‘from one subsidy to another’.163 Such ‘adhocracy’164 provoked even those sympathetic 
to the Fed. Paul Volcker, for instance, warned that the Fed might be viewed ‘as the rescuer or 
supporter of a particular section of the market, [which] is not strictly a monetary function in the 
way it’s been interpreted in the past’.165   
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We have encountered opposition to ‘discretionary governance’ and ‘adhocracy’ before: recall 
Overstone’s dispute with Palmer, his objection to ‘fitful and capricious’ responses ‘under special 
circumstances’, his search for a rule ‘strict and judicious’. These patterns reveal a further thread, 
the traces of which start with the fate of the Act of 1844: although its rigidity was smoothed over 
by intermittent suspensions, it was not repealed.166 Its on-going presence meant that the BoE could 
continue to refer merchants and bankers to the note issue limit imposed by the Act and maintain 
that this formal barrier prevented the BoE from offering them assistance.167 As we have seen, for 
many, the alternative to assistance was bankruptcy. The response today in the US and Europe has 
moved in a broadly similar direction. Perhaps because of the way it was stretched by the Fed in 
2008, section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act modifies section 13(3) of the FRA to prohibit the Fed 
from offering support to specific firms.168 A specific non-bank institution can still receive public 
funds but only via the Orderly Liquidation Authority, and so only to assist with its winding up 
where the institution is already insolvent.169 In Europe the ESM remains in place but, perhaps 
because it represents an innovation some see as outside of the spirit of Europe’s monetary order, 
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the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive170 puts in place a number of preconditions that must 
be met before public funds–including access to the ESM–may be used to recapitalise a bank in 
financial difficulties.171 From 1847 to the present, from Europe to the US, the general pattern 
repeats: ex ante restrictive measures limit the use of public funds to ‘afford assistance’ to troubled 
financial firms and instead channel these firms towards some version of a bankruptcy-style regime.  
 
As a number of commentators have argued, the obstacle facing special restructuring and 
liquidation regimes is their limited capacity to deal with economy-wide defaults and price 
collapses. They struggle to deal with such problems because bankruptcy-style regimes concentrate 
by design on specific financially troubled firms–many of which no doubt resemble Lord 
Overstone’s ‘noxious weeds’. But dealing with noxious weeds is not the same as responding to 
problems of a systemic nature.172 Indeed, it is plausible that bankruptcy-style regimes may even 
add to these problems. Where the bankruptcy-style regime imposes losses on creditors of a specific 
firm, creditors of other similarly situated firms–perceived to be or actually hovering on the line 
between solvency and insolvency–may decide to cut their losses by selling assets. Yet doing so 
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only adds to the general collapse in asset prices.173 If that happens, and if more people are harmed 
by these ex ante constraints than rule-makers expect, the party applying the rule will be faced with 
the same dilemma which confronted the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1847, namely, just how 




Formal barriers in the shape of ex ante restrictive measures are laudable for attempting to prevent 
the socialisation of losses. As we have seen, such regimes try to deter conduct harmful to the 
financial system from occurring by changing the behaviour of those who might otherwise make 
financially imprudent decisions. The hope is that financial institutions will act with greater self-
discipline and prudence if they know that they cannot seek the support of the monetary authority. 
And yet the obvious problem with such restrictive measures is that of credibility: what is to stop 
the authorities from suspending, or finding a plausible legal means of circumventing, these ex ante 
restrictions? If financial institutions know that suspension or circumvention is likely, why change 
their behaviour? Perhaps, then, the 1840s indicate that changing behaviour depends on an absolute 
and unconditional commitment to strict enforcement, no exceptions under any circumstances.  
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Such a commitment is, however, a highly risky strategy.175  It assumes that, should financial crises 
continue to occur, decision-makers will tolerate whatever consequences follow, no matter how 
unjust or absurd.176 But allowing losses to lie where they fall is difficult because a crisis involves 
contractual defaults and the collapse of asset prices both of which, as we saw in the 1840s, affect 
a broad range of individuals and communities. Consider again the choice confronting the 
employees of Joseph Pease, the coal-mine owner from Durham, between pawning their Sunday 
clothes and having enough to eat. Should Charles Wood have turned a blind eye to these 
consequences? 
 
The ‘drama of governance, the trivial or murderous drama of breaking eggs to make omelettes’,177 
saw Charles Wood tolerate willingly these harsh consequences–and much worse for the people of 
Ireland–for much of 1847. It is perfectly possible that no matter how absurd or unjust or fatal the 
consequences, some rule-appliers may decide to stand by the rule. Currency school proponents 
welcomed the turning of the ‘Bank screw’ because they saw it as protecting the value of the 
currency. Andrew Mellon, the US Secretary to the Treasury from 1921-1932, famously preferred 
to ‘liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate’; Alan Greenspan, 
chair of the Federal Reserve from 1987-2006, favoured the viewpoint of the second observer when 
he remarked that ‘one observer might use the term “market failure” to describe what another would 
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deem to have been a market outcome that was natural and healthy, even if harsh’.178 Yet harsh 
consequences are not inevitable. Since rules do not determine their own application, rule-appliers 
must choose to stand by the rule. As they face up to that choice, rule-appliers confront again the 
dilemma at the centre of the monetary order, that simultaneous desire for both sound money and 
expansive credit.   
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